Local Data  in European Choice of Law: A Trojan Horse from across the Atlantic? by Dornis, T.W.
  
305 
“LOCAL DATA” IN EUROPEAN CHOICE OF LAW: A TROJAN 
HORSE FROM ACROSS THE ATLANTIC? 
T.W. Dornis* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 306 
II. THE STATUS QUO ........................................................................... 309 
A. The Eternal Struggle: Conflicts vs. Substantive Justice ........... 309 
B. Issue-by-Issue Analysis vs. Lex Causae Universalism ............. 310 
C. The Contortion of Current Doctrine ........................................ 313 
1. From Bootstrap to Conundrum: Blind Trust in Party 
Expectations ...................................................................... 313 
2. A Terminological Masquerade: “Taking Account of” 
vs. Application ................................................................... 319 
III. RECONCEPTUALIZATION ................................................................. 320 
A. The Interplay of Tort Policies and Party Expectations ............ 321 
B. Caveat: The Vertical Inseparability of Policies ....................... 324 
C. A Horizontally-Layered Model of Liability Rules .................... 325 
1. Stratification ...................................................................... 326 
2. Categorization ................................................................... 328 
D. From Norm Categories to Party Expectations......................... 331 
1. Transformation .................................................................. 331 
2. Solutions for the Contested Scenarios ............................... 333 
IV. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK .............................................................. 336 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
 *  Professor of Law, Leuphana Law School, Germany.  J.S.M., Stanford Law School, 2009; 
Dr. iur., Eberhard Karls University, Germany, 2005.  The author thanks Morgan Stoffregen 
for a perfect editing of this Article (as always). 
306 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:305 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A transatlantic dichotomy runs through conflicts law.  The difference 
between the European and American approaches to “justice” in the 
resolution of international private law cases has been discussed extensively.1  
While this divide has grown smaller throughout the twentieth century, 
differences still abound.  One of these differences has been handled more 
pragmatically than doctrinally: the consideration of “local data.”  In 
European doctrine in particular, this issue still provides a cause for debate. 
Where does local data come from?  The concept of “datum” was first 
introduced by Brainerd Currie in 1958,2 and was further developed less than 
a decade later by Albert Ehrenzweig in his theory of local and moral data.3  
For moral data, application of the lex fori (the law of the forum) is 
mandatory, notwithstanding the existence of foreign elements that would 
otherwise suggest the application of foreign law.4  These are cases where 
justice or equity require a reliance on the law of the forum—hence, moral 
datum.5  Local data calls for precisely the opposite, it provides for an 
“automatic reference to foreign rules.”6  There is no rejection of foreign law; 
on the contrary, foreign law is openly admitted. In this sense, local data 
mainly concerns local rules of administration and security with regard to 
individual activities.7  Under the Rome II Regulation, these norms are called 
“rules of safety and conduct.”8  In the United States, a codified version of 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See, e.g., Gerhard Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 RECUEIL DES COURS 91 
(1964-II); Gerhard Kegel, Wandel auf dünnem Eis, in ZUM WANDEL DES INTERNATIONALEN 
PRIVATRECHTS 35–44 (Friedrich K. Juenger ed., 1974).  See also GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS 
SCHURIG, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT § 2, 128–61 (9th ed. 2004).  For the more recent 
development of a “rapprochement” of European and U.S. tort conflicts law, see Jan 
Kropholler & Jan von Hein, From Approach to Rule-Orientation in American Tort Conflicts?, 
in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD – ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 
(James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002).  
 2 Brainerd Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964 
(1958).  
 3 Albert A Ehrenzweig, Local and Moral Data in the Conflict of Laws: Terra Incognita, 16 
BUFF. L. REV. 55 (1966). 
 4 Id. at 56. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 55.  
 7 See 2 ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 245 (1960).  
 8 Regulation (EC) No. 867/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), art. 17, 2007 O.J. (L 
199), 40, 46 [hereinafter Rome II]. 
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choice of law with an express rule on “standards of conduct and safety” 
exists in the Louisiana Civil Code.9  At the international level, earlier 
examples can be found in the Hague Conventions on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents (1971)10 and on the Law Applicable to Products Liability 
(1973).11 
What is the theory about?  Whenever the lex causae (the law determined 
by choice-of-law rules) is not the law of the place of conduct, the question 
arises of whether to give consideration to rules of safety and conduct.  This is 
the case if conduct and injury diverge and the law at the place of injury (lex 
loci damni) applies.  It may also be the case if the law of the parties’ 
common domicile or common residence jurisdiction (lex domicilii 
communis) or a law determined under an escape clause is applied.12  An oft-
enunciated hypothetical situation is a traffic accident between two French 
tourists in England.  While the French lex domicilii communis may be 
applied with respect to the liability of the tortfeasor, the English rule of 
driving on the left side of the street—hence, “local data”—provides for the 
standard of conduct.  The rationale is as simple as it is convincing: 
consideration of this rule is mandatory when assessing the tortfeasor’s 
negligence at the time and place of accident causation.  The tortfeasor cannot 
claim that he was acting in accordance with French traffic laws while driving 
his car in England. 
What is the problem? At first glance, there seems to be no room for 
debate.  In fact, the consideration of local data is often described as a matter 
                                                                                                                   
 9 LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3543 (1992).  The article concerns “Issues of conduct and safety,” 
and provides: 
 Issues pertaining to standards of conduct and safety are governed by the law 
of the state in which the conduct that caused the injury occurred, if the injury 
occurred in that state or in another state whose law did not provide for a 
higher standard of conduct. 
 In all other cases, those issues are governed by the law of the state in which 
the injury occurred, provided that the person whose conduct caused the injury 
should have foreseen its occurrence in that state. 
 The preceding paragraph does not apply to cases in which the conduct that 
caused the injury occurred in this state and was caused by a person who was 
domiciled in, or had another significant connection with, this state.  These 
cases are governed by the law of this state. 
Id. 
 10 Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents art. 7, May 4, 1971, 965 
U.N.T.S. 416. 
 11 Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability art. 9, Oct. 2, 1973, 1056 
U.N.T.S. 196. 
 12 See, e.g., Rome II, supra note 8, art. 4(3). 
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of logical necessity.13  At least on paper, there is agreement that considering 
local data also accommodates lawmakers’ interest in controlling local 
socioeconomic transacting.14  This agreement, however, does not signal a 
change of direction in European doctrine, which is still formal and hardly 
policy oriented.  As we will see, local data is at the center of a doctrinal 
battle between proponents of traditional jurisdiction selection and those who 
advocate for a more content-oriented choice of law. 
A deeper analysis requires exploring a number of aspects: first, we must 
shed some light on the actual status of European choice-of-law doctrine vis-
à-vis the U.S. approach.  This shows that giving regard to substantive 
policies and underlying state interests is no longer completely anathema to 
continental choice of law.  Decision-makers are no longer confined to 
considering aspects of conflicts justice alone.  Yet substantive policy is still 
neglected when it comes to implementing the theory of local data in practice.  
Second, as a doctrinal reconceptualization reveals, a reconsideration of party 
expectations and a change of directions with respect to substantive law 
policies and state interests will play out beneficially in cases where 
conventional European wisdom cannot provide for a solution.  In this regard, 
the consideration of local data may truly open the door to substantivist 
wisdom from across the Atlantic.  Finally, looking at the bigger picture, we 
can conclude that local data is a field where different legal orders converge. 
What Ehrenzweig once termed a terra incognita, and what has since 
remained a stepchild of European doctrine, may actually serve as a 
condensation point for a more modernized and globalized conflicts law. 
                                                                                                                   
 13 For examples of pre-Rome conflicts law in Europe, particularly in Germany and 
Switzerland, see Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 23, 1971, 57 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] [Federal Court of 
Civil Matters] 265 (268), 1971 (Ger.); BOTSCHAFT ZUM BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS 
INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT (IPR-GESETZ) VOM 10. NOVEMBER 1982 [BUNDESRAT], BBl. 
1983, 263, 431 (284.4) (Switz.); Anton Heini, art. 142, in ZÜRCHER KOMMENTAR ZUM 
BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT (IPRG) VOM 18. DEZEMBER 1987, 
paras. 15–16 (Daniel Girsberger et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004); Robert P. Umbricht & Nicole Zeller, 
art. 142, in BASLER KOMMENTAR, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT para. 14 (Heinrich Honsell 
et al. ed., 2007). 
 14 Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 55–57; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 
Nov. 23, 1971, 57 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 
[Federal Court of Civil Matters] 265 (268), 1971 (Ger.); HANS STOLL, Zum Problem der 
Vorfrage im Internationalen Deliktsrecht, in MULTUM NON MULTA, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KURT 
LIPSTEIN AUS ANLASS SEINES 70. GEBURTSTAGES 259, 261 (Peter Feuerstein ed., 1980); Abbo 
Junker, art. 17 Rom II-VO, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH: 
BGB para. 1 (Roland Rixecker & Franz J. Säcker eds., 5th ed. 2010).  
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II.  THE STATUS QUO 
Differences between the traditional European doctrine, which still 
principally tends to disregard underlying policy considerations, and the once-
deemed revolutionary U.S. approach, which embodies a trend of considering 
such interests in lieu of applying formalistic schemata, have been debated 
extensively.  Much ink has been spilled on the issue of how, if at all, to give 
regard to substantive policies and state interests beyond the Savignian 
paradigm of a mostly private international law.  Over the decades, modern 
European choice of law may have become more policy oriented.  Yet many 
aspects remain untouched by this trend of modernization.  One such aspect is 
the European doctrine’s aversion to case-by-case analyses and, accordingly, 
to dépeçage. 
A.  The Eternal Struggle: Conflicts vs. Substantive Justice 
The divergence between the European and U.S. approaches is still 
fittingly emblematized by the theories put forth by two key scholars: Gerhard 
Kegel and David Cavers.  In defense of the European tradition, Kegel 
advocated a disregard for the content of the relevant laws when determining 
the applicable regime.  Choice of law, he explained, aims to find not the 
“objectively best law” but the “spatially best law.”  Accordingly, “conflicts 
justice takes functional precedence over substantive justice.”15  In defense of 
U.S. doctrine, Cavers concluded that in conflicts law, “the court is not idly 
choosing a law; it is determining a controversy.  How can it choose wisely 
without considering how that choice will affect that controversy?”16 
Of course, this battle has lost much of its fervor and, today, things are not 
as black and white as they used to be.  Europe has, at least in part, forsworn 
the once strictly-followed concept of content-neutral jurisdiction selection.  
Tort conflicts is representative: a number of provisions of the Rome II 
Regulation actually give regard to substance, as can be seen in the 
instrument’s consumer-protection impulse in product-liability conflicts, the 
                                                                                                                   
 15 KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 1, § 2, 131 (“Deswegen ist die internationalprivatrechtliche 
Gerechtigkeit der materiell-privatrechtlichen funktionell vorgeordnet.” (literally: “Therefore, 
conflicts justice takes functional precedence over substantive justice.”).  See also Gerhard Kegel, 
Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz im Internationalen Privatrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT HANS 
LEWALD 259, 270 (Max Gerwig et al. eds., 1978). 
 16 David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 189 
(1933). 
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multiple policies accommodated under the rules for international unfair 
competition conflicts, the express aim of international environmental 
protection, and the rigid regulation of choice-of-law clauses.17  Yet with 
regard to a court’s decision making—that is, the actual application of choice-
of-law rules—an express content-oriented determination of the applicable 
law or an ad hoc modification of choice-of-law results will seldom occur.  In 
this regard, the technical and structural formalism has survived all 
transformative developments toward more substantivist conflicts doctrine. 
One might even say that European conflicts law still reflects classical 
nineteenth-century methodology based on the paradigm of private law 
substitutability.  Carl Friedrich von Savigny, the founder of the discipline in 
Europe, considered private law a largely “apolitical” affair, and sought only 
to regulate private relations among free individuals.  Accordingly, the state 
had no direct involvement.18  Until today, this has been the basis of the 
assumption that the private laws of different states are almost freely 
substitutable.  And until today, this substitution has been all-encompassing.  
In other words, when a certain law is found applicable, rather than governing 
single elements of the case it is expected to govern all issues. 
It is this remnant of traditional doctrine that causes trouble in a number of 
ways, particularly when the lex causae is different from the local law at the 
place of tortfeasor conduct.  As further discussed below,19 the consideration 
of local data may remedy the shortcomings of the still prevalent all-or-
nothing approach in European doctrine.  Nevertheless, the persistent half-
heartedness of current European doctrine stands in the way of practicality 
and theoretical consistency. 
B.  Issue-by-Issue Analysis vs. Lex Causae Universalism 
Under modern U.S. conflicts law, different laws may apply to different 
issues of the same case.20  Indeed, this is expressly required in order to select 
the most suitable regime for single issues, since these issues may be subject 
                                                                                                                   
 17 See Rome II, supra note 8, arts. 5, 6, 7, 14; see also id. Recitals 20, 21, 25, 31. 
 18 See generally KLAUS VOGEL, DER RÄUMLICHE ANWENDUNGSBEREICH DER 
VERWALTUNGSNORM 215 (1965); CHRISTIAN JOERGES, ZUM FUNKTIONSWANDEL DES 
KOLLISIONSRECHTS: DIE “GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST ANALYSIS” UND DIE “KRISE DES 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS” 6 (1971).  
 19 See infra Part II.C. 
 20 See Peter Hay, Contemporary Approaches to Non-Contractual Obligations in Private 
International Law (Conflict of Law) and the European Community’s “Rome II” Regulation, 7 
EUR. LEGAL FORUM I-137, at 141–42 (2007). 
2016] “LOCAL DATA” IN EUROPEAN CHOICE OF LAW  311 
 
 
to different policies and, accordingly, different states’ concerns may play out 
in the balancing of interests involved.21  For example, different laws may 
apply to the standard of safety and conduct on the one hand, and the 
consequences of a defendant’s violation of that standard (e.g., damages) on 
the other.  The issue of local data would thus not warrant exceptional 
treatment. 
By this means, the U.S. approach allows for flexibility, and, ultimately, 
more territoriality. The latter characteristic may appear paradoxical at first 
sight.  After all, it was the Currian revolution of interest analysis in the 1950s 
that virtually swept the governing Bealean territoriality from bookshelves 
and court dockets.  By definition, interest analysis takes a quasi-statutist 
position: conflict resolution requires choosing between rules of decision, not 
between legal regimes.22  This choice is made with specific regard to—and 
ideally in accordance with—a balancing of substantive policies.  At the same 
time, this means that interest analysis must reject the technical automatism of 
traditional choice of law, particularly Savignian concepts like the “seat” of a 
relationship and other jurisdiction-selecting analyses.23  Accordingly, the 
U.S. approach has been described as embracing an “antiterritorialist 
principle.”24 
Remarkably, however, territoriality has held the fort with respect to local 
rules of safety and conduct. Concretely, U.S. practice has developed a 
distinction between “conduct-regulating” and “loss-allocating” rules.  While 
conduct-regulating rules are to be taken from the regime governing at the 
place of conduct, loss-allocating rules may be treated more flexibly and, 
hence, be chosen from a different law, such as the parties’ lex domicilii 
communis.25  
The situation is quite different on the continent.  Even though choice of 
law has become more content-oriented, the Rome II Regulation is still both a 
product and an instrument of traditional formalist technique.  Of course, as in 
the U.S. approach, in continental choice of law, the lex causae may be 
detached from the place of tortious activity.  For example, this is the case if 
conduct and injury occur in different states, or if the lex domicilii communis, 
                                                                                                                   
 21 Id.  
 22 See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 
DUKE L.J. 171, reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 179 (1963).  
 23 Professor Currie summarized his position in his oft-cited verdict: “We would be better 
off without choice-of-law rules.”  Id. at 183. 
 24 DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 166 (1965).  
 25 For a closer analysis of these categories, see infra Part III.B. 
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or the law of a “manifestly more closely connected country” applies.26  
Conflicts determination here is straightforward: in principle, the whole case 
is subject to the single regime of the lex causae.  Accordingly, rules of safety 
and conduct at the place of the alleged tortfeasor’s activity are disregarded.  
This is when the theory of local data comes into play—alas, we must be 
more careful: could come into play.  In fact, an express rule on the 
consideration of local data has been codified in Article 17 of Rome II.27  Yet, 
a theoretically consistent and workable application is still hindered by 
structural, if not cultural, obstacles. 
As is commonly explained, the lex causae should cover the whole case 
and apply to all of its issues.28  There is no issue-by-issue analysis, and a 
dépeçage must be avoided.29  In this way, choice of law reflects a 
fundamental characteristic of civil law—the concept of a self-contained 
code.  Common law systems are based on the idea of incremental and ad hoc 
lawmaking by judges.  In civil law, by contrast, the promulgation of law in 
codified statutes is expected to provide for a coherent collection and 
arrangement of rules.  Each code is conceived of as a mechanical construct 
where all elements systematically work together to guarantee its 
functioning.30  In choice of law, not surprisingly, this conception complicates 
matters.  Since all components of the legal order have their well-defined and 
strictly determined functions, they must not be dissolved or separated from 
the system as a whole.  It is thus virtually impossible to substitute or 
exchange single elements of the system with a corresponding element of a 
different legal order.31  If any substitution occurs at all, it must be of the 
                                                                                                                   
 26 See Rome II, supra note 8, art. 4(1)–(3). 
 27 Id. art. 17.  
 28 See, e.g., id. art. 15 (providing for this type of universality for non-contractual obligations).  
 29 See, e.g., Helmut Koziol, Verhaltensunrechtslehre und Deliktsstatut, in FESTSCHRIFT 
BEITZKE 577, 582–83 (Otto Sandrock ed., 1979); Hans Stoll, Die Behandlung von 
Verhaltensnormen und Sicherheitsvorschriften, in VORSCHLÄGE UND GUTACHTEN ZUR REFORM 
DES DEUTSCHEN INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS DER AUßERVERTRAGLICHEN 
SCHULDVERHÄLTNISSE 160, 172–73 (Ernst von Caemmerer ed., 1983); Heini, supra note 13, 
paras. 1, 11.  Of course, Rome II contains certain provisions that may offer a possibility of 
dépeçage.  See, e.g., Rome II, supra note 8, arts. 8(2), 14, 16, 18–20.  But the regulation does 
not expressly allow for, or even encourage, such a technique.  See Symeon C. Symeonides, 
Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 185 (2008).  
 30 For an example of the civil and common law divide in terms of codes and codification, 
see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION ch. 5 
(3d ed. 2007). 
 31 For traditional choice of law, see PAUL HEINRICH NEUHAUS, DIE GRUNDBEGRIFFE DES 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS § 16, at 83 (1962).  For an interesting critique of traditional 
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whole system.  Accordingly, with respect to the category of rules that 
concern “safety and conduct,” there is general agreement that its number 
must be kept small in order to keep the system from fraying.32  This 
requirement of lex causae universalism explains the traditional European 
inflexibility with respect to choice-of-law determination. 
C.  The Contortion of Current Doctrine 
We have already alluded to the fact that the provision on local rules of 
safety and conduct contained in Article 17 of Rome II appears to provide a 
convenient entry point for the reconciliation of substantive policies without 
necessarily neglecting concerns of conflicts justice.33  Yet the traditional 
European dépeçage-phobia and an antiterritorial misconception of local data 
still stand in the way.  The focus on private parties’ interests may sometimes 
point toward the application of local rules on safety and conduct.  However, 
quite often this focus leaves the decision-maker without guidance.  In these 
cases, European choice of law not only tends to shortchange parties’ 
concerns but also misinterprets their expectations. 
1. From Bootstrap to Conundrum: Blind Trust in Party Expectations  
Of course, giving regard to substantive policies by means of local-data 
consideration is nothing new.  This idea was actually suggested prior to the 
communitarization of European choice of law.  For instance, in 1971, the 
German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) expressly referred to 
lawmakers’ interest in regulating the local safety as a justification for 
considering local data at the place of conduct.  The interest to be considered 
was a substantive policy.34  In the same vein, modern scholarly commentary 
                                                                                                                   
doctrine and a new conception of local data on the basis of a datum-oriented modification of 
the lex causae, see Marc-Philippe Weller, Das Individuum und die Datumtheorie: Die 
“Personne Plurielle” der Postmoderne als Herausforderung des binären IPR, in DIE PERSON 
IM IPR (M. Gebauer et al. eds. (forthcoming 2016)). 
 32 See JEAN LOUIS DELACHAUX, DIE ANKNÜPFUNG DER OBLIGATIONEN AUS DELIKT UND 
QUASIDELIKT IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT 197 (1960); VERENA TRUTMANN, DAS 
INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT DER DELIKTSOBLIGATIONEN 100 (1973); Stoll, supra note 29, at 
172–73.  For more recent evidence, see, e.g., UMBRICHT & ZELLER, supra note 13, para. 3.  
 33 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting that Article 17 provides an express rule 
on the consideration of local data, but that a consistent application is not yet realized). 
 34 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 23, 1971, 57 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] [Federal Court of 
Civil Matters] 265 (268), 1971 (Ger.).  See also Stoll, supra note 29, at 176. 
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contends that tort law policies could not be effectively enforced if choice of 
law did not give regard to local regulation by means of considering local 
data.35  However, the interplay between substantive policies and concerns of 
traditional conflicts justice has yet to be explained in detail.  Two scenarios, 
explored below, illustrate the current approach.  Both examples prove the 
existing misconception.  
The first scenario relates to torts where conduct and injury occur in the 
same state.  By and large, the local law will apply as the lex loci delicti 
commissi.  Under the conditions of Article 4(2) or (3) of Rome II, however, 
the lex causae may differ from the local regime.  The tortfeasor may then 
face a dilemma insofar as the local regime might require a standard of 
conduct that is different from the standard under the regime that ultimately 
determines his liability.  For many cases, of course, the parties’ expectations 
may converge and point toward the application of the local standard of safety 
and conduct.  Then, Article 17 of the Rome II Regulation will truly alleviate 
the dilemma regarding the predictability of the applicable law.  If the 
tortfeasor cannot be expected to foresee the ultimately applicable regime, he 
can at least refer to the local rules of conduct under the rubric of local data.36  
Similarly, the victim’s expectations are protected to the extent that he can 
reasonably trust only in the application of the protective regime at the place 
where his rights and entitlements are located when the tort strikes.37  In most 
cases, therefore, if conduct and injury coincide, local law applies—as 
expected by all parties involved.  
However, as argued in current theory and embodied in current practice, 
there are cases where party expectations seem to point toward a regime other 
than the law at the locus delicti.  In these cases, the existence or nonexistence 
                                                                                                                   
 35 See, e.g., Gerhard Wagner, Die neue Rom II-Verordnung, 28 PRAXIS DES 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS (IPRAX) 1, 5 (2008); Junker, supra note 
14, para. 1; UMBRICHT & ZELLER, supra note 13, para. 14.  See also OTTO KAHN-FREUND, 
DELICTUAL LIABILITY AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 124 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 95 (1968).  
 36 Rome II, supra note 8, Recital. 34; Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations (Rome II), at 25, COM (2003) 427 final (July 22, 
2003) [hereinafter Rome II Proposal]; Jan von Hein, Die Behandlung von Sicherheits- und 
Verhaltensregeln nach Art. 17 der Rom II-Verordnung, in GRENZEN ÜBERWINDEN - PRINZIPIEN 
BEWAHREN: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR BERND VON HOFFMANN ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 139 (Herbert 
Kronke & Karsten Thorn eds., 2011). 
 37 Helmut Koziol & Thomas Thiede, Kritische Bemerkungen zum derzeitigen Stand des 
Entwurfs einer Rom II-Verordnung, 106 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (ZVGLRWISS) 235, 241 (2007).  
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of a pre-tort relationship between the parties is deemed crucial.38  For 
example: 
Two parties who share the same habitual residence are 
traveling abroad by car.  If the driver negligently causes an 
accident that injures her fellow passenger, the question arises 
regarding what rules of safety and conduct to apply in order to 
determine driver-tortfeasor liability.39 
The example and its solution under current doctrine exemplify a paradox: 
for traffic laws in particular, commentary and practice distinguish between 
rules that are “strictly territorial” and rules that are deemed to allow for a 
more “flexible” application.  An exact demarcation, it is openly admitted, is 
hard to draw.40 
Nevertheless, some categories are considered self-evident.41  Strictly 
territorial rules, for instance, are those concerning the correct side of the road 
to use.  Such rules are supposed to apply regardless of the situation.42  In 
comparison, flexible rules include, inter alia, obligations to use a seatbelt or 
regulations on alcohol limits.  These rules are supposed to be more adaptable 
insofar as individuals from the same country should be able to “carry” their 
lex communis with them into a foreign jurisdiction.  The local law is then 
disregarded.43  With respect to alcohol limits, for instance, courts have found 
                                                                                                                   
 38 Strictly speaking, two variants must be distinguished.  Yet the second is less relevant for 
this analysis: arguably, the lex domicilii communis may apply to parties hailing from the same 
state who lack a pre-tort relationship.  See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice] Jan. 8, 1985, 93 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN 
[BGHZ] [Federal Court of Civil Matters] 214, 1985 (Ger.); Abbo Junker, Das Internationale 
Privatrecht der Straßenverkehrsunfälle nach der Rom-II-Verordnung, JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 
169, 174 (2008); CAVERS, supra note 24, at 139.  In these cases, it is difficult to imagine how 
either the tortfeasor or victim could expect the parties’ lex communis to be applied.  Usually, 
neither their tortious encounter nor their common residence can be foreseen.  Such cases are 
better subjected to the lex loci damni.  See Rome II, supra note 8, art. 4(3). 
 39 Other examples of this class of cases include international torts between husband and 
wife, between worker and patron, and between colleagues or other primarily social actors 
(e.g., fellow members of an expedition). 
 40 See, e.g., Stoll, supra note 29, at 177.  
 41 For an extensive overview, see ROBERT SIEGHÖRTNER, INTERNATIONALES 
STRAßENVERKEHRSUNFALLRECHT 437–50 (2002).  
 42 von Hein, supra note 36, at 145. 
 43 Koziol, supra note 29, at 585; Hans Stoll, Zur Flexibilisierung des europäischen 
internationalen Deliktsrechts: Vermittelnde Kritik aus Amerika an der “Rom-II-VO,” in 
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a more liberal lex communis to prevail over a stricter regime at the place of 
conduct.44  Further, it has been argued that the judge should take account of 
the common-domicile rules, even if the law of the place of conduct is less 
strict.45 
A real-world example in this respect is a car accident in France involving 
a German couple.  One member of the couple, the passenger, was sleeping in 
the car’s front seat without having buckled up.  The driver had failed to 
ensure that the passenger had fastened her seatbelt.  According to the court, 
France’s potentially more liberal seatbelt regulations were irrelevant; the 
violation of a duty under German law was deemed sufficient to hold the 
driver liable.46  
Upon first look, it is questionable whether such a “transplant” of the 
parties’ home regime to a different jurisdiction is warranted.  From the 
perspective of party expectations, it must be doubted whether a shared 
habitual residence somewhere else trumps the local foundation of tortious 
activities at the place of conduct.  This is unmistakably expressed in the 
saying “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.”47  Traffic accidents are 
particularly illustrative: foreign parties sharing the same habitual residence 
may travel alone in a single car and thus appear somewhat secluded from the 
public.  Yet any car ride on public streets implies contact with third parties. 
Shouldn’t the tortfeasor thus be expected to comply with local traffic rules?  
Similarly, shouldn’t the victim be entitled to share an expectation that people 
on the road will obey local traffic rules?  Moreover, a problem exists with 
respect to logical consistency: if an issue-by-issue analysis or a dépeçage is 
                                                                                                                   
HAFTUNG UND VERSICHERUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR RUDOLF REISCHAUER 389, 408 (Peter 
Japornegg et al. eds., 2010). 
 44 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 21, 1978, 
VERSICHERUNGSRECHT (VERSR) 541 (542), 1978 (Ger.).  
 45 Stoll, supra note 29, at 175; von Hein, supra note 36. 
 46 Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [OLG] [Circuit Court of Karlsruhe] Oct. 3, 1984, RECHT 
UND SCHADEN (R+S) 171 (172), 1985 (Ger.).  See also Kammergericht Berlin [KG] [Circuit 
Court of Berlin], Nov. 30, 1981, VERSICHERUNGSRECHT (VERSR) 1199, 1982 (Ger.).  
 47 For a succinct overview, see LEO RAAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 537 (4th ed. 
1955).  See also Tim W. Dornis, “When in Rome, do as the Romans do?” A Defense of the 
Lex Domicilii Communis in the Rome-II-Regulation, 4 EUR. LEGAL FORUM 152 (2007).  But 
see Stoll, supra note 29, at 178 (“Besteht zwischen den an dem Unfall Beteiligten ein 
besonderes Verhältnis . . . so betrifft der Schädigungsvorgang hauptsächlich dieses Verhältnis, 
wohingegen die Verhältnisse am Unfallort für diesen Vorgang mehr oder weniger irrelevant 
sind . . . .”) [“If the parties to a tort have a preexisting relationship . . . the tort primarily 
concerns this relationship; the circumstances at the place of conduct will then be less 
relevant.”]. 
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so distortive for the self-contained mechanics of private law, as civil law 
doctrine holds,48 why must there be an additional subcategorization within 
the sector of local data?  By this means, the systematic consistency of 
traditional choice-of-law technique is further eroded.  
The second scenario where the application of local-data theory is 
complicated is when the decision maker is not only bootstrapped by an 
assumption of overly flexible expectations, as just explained, but is also left 
to his own devices when these expectations are irreconcilable.  It is usually 
in cases where the tortfeasor’s conduct takes place in a state different from 
where the injury occurs that this problem emerges.  In such cases, application 
of the general rule of tort conflicts in many choice-of-law regimes, notably 
under Article 4(1) of Rome II, leads to a divergence between the lex loci 
damni as lex causae and the local law accounting for the rules of safety and 
conduct.49  A scenario often found in U.S. casebooks is that of blasting 
activities near state lines.50  This scenario has two variations: 
Variation 1: State A imposes negligence liability on all blasting 
activities within its borders.  Neighboring state B has 
established strict liability.  If the defendant undertakes blasting 
activities in state A near the border with state B and damages 
the plaintiff’s property in B without acting negligently, the 
question is whether he can rely on his home regime to avoid 
liability. 
 
Variation 2: State A imposes strict liability on all blasting 
activities within its borders.  Neighboring state B requires 
proof of negligence.  The defendant undertakes blasting 
activities in state A near the border with state B and damages 
the plaintiff’s property in B—without proof of negligence.  
Here, the question arises whether he should be strictly liable as 
provided for under the law of state A.  
                                                                                                                   
 48 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 49 This also is the case under alternative approaches, such as the “most significant 
relationship” test of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971), or the 
“last event” rule under the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). 
 50 One example is Dallas v. Whitney, where a West Virginia court applied Ohio’s absolute 
liability rule to the claim of an Ohio plaintiff whose property situated in Ohio was damaged by 
the defendant’s blasting activities in Virginia.  See Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 
S.E. 766 (1936).  See also CAVERS, supra note 24, at 161.  More recently, these examples 
have been used by Symeon C. Symeonides, supra note 29, at 187. 
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Under Article 4(1) of Rome II, the lex loci damni applies to both 
variations.51  Following the plain letter of the code, the rules of safety and 
conduct at the place of acting will not apply.  These rules may be considered 
only insofar as they are local data.  
Under the first variation, if the rules of safety and conduct are stricter 
under the lex loci damni than under the lex loci actus, Article 17 of Rome II 
seems to fulfill its intended purpose to balance the parties’ interests.  Unless 
the tortfeasor had to expect the injury to occur in a different jurisdiction, he 
will be allowed to rely on local law.52  This also seems to be the obvious 
conclusion to draw from Recital 34, which provides that local law theory is 
the counterbalance to Article 4(1), which generally prefers the victim over 
the tortfeasor.53  However, a critical conundrum arises upon closer 
inspection: if Article 17 allows for the disregard of the general rule, will the 
tortfeasor not ultimately be disproportionately preferred over the victim?54  
In the end, Article 17 may go beyond merely counterbalancing the victim’s 
interests.  
Things become even more dubious in the second variation.  If the rules of 
safety and conduct are stricter under the lex loci actus than under the lex loci 
damni, giving regard to local standards cannot work in favor of the 
tortfeasor.  The dominant opinion on Article 17 contends that the provision 
should remain unapplied, and the tortfeasor should not be held liable under 
the rules at the place of conduct.  This is said to account for the provision’s 
narrow aim to eliminate unfair surprise to the defendant.  After all, 
expectations of the victim that go beyond the standard of safety and conduct 
in the state where the injury occurs are “not worthy of protection.”55  This, 
however, is not the only possible interpretation.  As Cavers has explained, 
the conduct in such cases is “just as bad when the victim is an outsider as an 
insider,” and an extension of the stricter local regime will—at least if the 
                                                                                                                   
 51 Rome II, supra note 8, art. 4(1). 
 52 See Symeonides, supra note 29, at 213–14.  See also CAVERS, supra note 24, at 139; 
RAAPE, supra note 47, at 537.  
 53 von Hein, supra note 36, at 140.  
 54 See Rome II, supra note 8, art. 17 (allowing consideration of rules of safety and conduct 
in force at the place where the tortious activity occurred). 
 55 Ivo Bach, Art. 17, Rome II, in ROME II REGULATION: POCKET COMMENTARY, para. 11 
(Peter Huber ed., 2011); see also Wagner, supra note 35, at 6; Helmut Koziol, Einige Fragen 
des internationalen Schadenersatzrechts, 25 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERKEHRSRECHT (ZVR) 1, 4 
(1980).  
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injury in another state was foreseeable for the tortfeasor—rarely be 
objectionable.56  
As this overview makes clear, European doctrine has not yet formulated a 
consistent theory of local data.  Not only may a balancing of expectations 
end in a paradoxically deterritorialized norm differentiation, but it is often 
simply impossible to formulate a workable basis for the relevant 
expectations.  
2.  A Terminological Masquerade: “Taking Account of” vs. Application 
To complete this overview of the status quo and bolster the idea that it is 
high time for reorientation, it is necessary to shed some light on legal 
terminology.  Under the dominant approach, local rules of safety and conduct 
are not “applied” as law but merely taken account of “as a matter of fact.”  
The violation of a foreign rule will thus be taken as a given by the trier of 
fact when applying the lex causae to the dispute at bar.57  In the words of the 
European Commission:  
Taking account of foreign law is not the same thing as applying 
it: the court will apply only the law that is applicable under the 
conflict rule, but it must take account of another law as a point 
of fact.58  
William Reppy has fittingly called this approach an “eclectic dépeçage” 
and has characterized the “taking account of” local law (instead of applying 
it) as “bizarre.”59  Indeed, if we look at a central axiom of international law 
and choice of law, we can see that “taking account of” local law is a 
misnomer.  If a legal regime is valid only within its respective jurisdiction, 
the regime may not be extended across national borders.  Therefore, a 
                                                                                                                   
 56 CAVERS, supra note 24, at 160.  See also Symeonides, supra note 29, at 192, 214. 
 57 See Stoll, supra note 29, at 174–75; Bernd von Hoffmann, art 40, in J. VON STAUDINGERS 
KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH: STAUDINGER BGB – EGBGB/IPR VORBEM ZU 
EGBGB para. 58 (2001). 
 58 See Rome II Proposal, supra note 36, at 25.  Accordingly, under the Rome II Regulation, 
foreign rules are treated as law only with respect to the standard of proof.  ANDREW 
DICKINSON, THE ROME II REGULATION: THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NON-CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS para. 15.33 (2008); JAMES FAWCETT ET AL., PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 855 
(14th ed. 2008). 
 59 William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Methods for Resolving Tort and Contract Conflict 
of Laws: The United States and the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2053, 2086–87 (2008).  
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national norm on local conduct should not be applied to factual scenarios 
taking place abroad. 
To take a concrete example, French traffic regulations cannot be violated 
by driving a car in England.  Conversely, however, in order to determine 
whether a foreign law has been violated, its norms must be literally 
“applied.”  There is no other way to promulgate the relevant “data”—that is, 
to ascertain that a foreign legal norm has actually been violated.60  In 
essence, therefore, “taking account of” local data means actually enforcing 
policies other than those underlying the lex causae.61  Consequently, the 
current dogma of nonapplication is a doctrinal and technical workaround 
designed to conceal what courts are actually doing when considering local 
rules of safety and conduct. 
In sum, European doctrine suffers from a number of defects. Its 
traditional dépeçage-phobia and its overemphasis on conflicts justice, 
particularly party expectations, stand in the way of a new beginning.  
III.  RECONCEPTUALIZATION 
When we look at the understanding of tort law underlying the Rome II 
Regulation, it becomes clear that the existing problems in conflicts doctrine 
are not just a remnant of European choice-of-law history, but also the 
product of a certain myopia regarding substantive policies.  A new 
perspective is needed.  Extending the focus to all relevant tort law functions 
helps to reconceptualize the interplay between concerns for substantive 
policy and conflicts justice; and, it ultimately allows us to formulate a 
consistent and workable model for the consideration of local data. 
                                                                                                                   
 60 See Heinrich Dörner, Neue Entwicklungen im Internationalen Verkehrsunfallrecht, 
JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU (JR) 6, 9 (1994). 
 61 Of course, one must not forget that this perspective is difficult to uphold in light of 
European lawmakers’ choice of words.  See Rome II, supra note 8, art. 17 (“account shall be 
taken, as a matter of fact”); id. Recital 34 (“account must be taken, as a matter of fact”).  
Nonetheless, the contrary opinion is more consistent in demanding a direct and unconcealed 
“application” of local law “as law.”  See Heinrich Dörner, Alte und neue Probleme des 
Internationalen Deliktsrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR HANS STOLL ZUM 75 GEBURSTAG (Gerhard 
Hohloch et al. eds., 2001); Dörner, supra note 60, at 9–10; Thomas Pfeiffer, Datumtheorie 
und “local data” in der Rom II-VO – am Beispiel von Straßenverkehrsunfällen, in LIBER 
AMICORUM KLAUS SCHURIG 229, 234 (R. Michaels et al. eds., 2012). 
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A.  The Interplay of Tort Policies and Party Expectations 
European lawmakers’ explanation of substantive policies highlights the 
problem.  The European Commission’s understanding of tort policies 
appears as straightforward as it is convincing.  It emphasizes victims’ 
concerns.  As the Commission explains, the general rule of the lex loci damni 
in Article 4(1) of Rome II 
establishes an objective link between the damage and the 
applicable law [and] further reflects the modern concept of the 
law of civil liability which is no longer, as it was in the first 
half of the last century, oriented towards punishing for fault-
based conduct: nowadays, it is the compensation function that 
dominates . . . .62 
This focus reflects a traditional perspective of tort policies, and seems to 
suggest the prioritization of compensation over prevention and deterrence.63  
Yet this view inaccurately describes the economic foundations and the state 
of modern tort doctrine.  In fact, unlike what the European Commission 
seems to have in mind, modern tort law no longer primarily serves to 
compensate for the victim’s injury; it also aims to regulate conduct and 
activity.  Of course, compensation may still be a purpose of tort law; but the 
focus no longer is on the ex post reparation of injuries.  On the contrary, 
compensation is the precondition for an ex ante function of tort law.  The 
existence of a tort liability system regulates individuals’ conduct within a 
community.64  Compensation and prevention are inseparable functions in the 
mechanics of any tort regime.65  
                                                                                                                   
 62 Rome II Proposal, supra note 36, at 12. 
 63 For the traditional argument that compensation is the only relevant concern and 
deterrence or prevention are of secondary concern, see Stoll, supra note 29, at 173.  
 64 See, e.g., ROBERT B. COOTER JR. & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 175–219 (6th 
ed. 2014); HEIN KÖTZ & GERHARD WAGNER, DELIKTSRECHT 29–44 (12th ed. 2013).  For 
examples of conflicts, see Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Katrin Lantermann, Choice of Law from an 
Economic Perspective, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 114 
(Jürgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006). 
 65 For the U.S. perspective, see PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 15, § 4, 
at 20 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 2004).  For the European perspective, see GERT 
BRÜGGEMEIER, PRINZIPIEN DES HAFTUNGSRECHTS – EINE SYSTEMATISCHE DARSTELLUNG AUF 
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER GRUNDLAGE 3 (1999); Gerhard Wagner, Grundstrukturen des 
Europäischen Deliktsrechts, in GRUNDSTRUKTUREN DES EUROPÄISCHEN DELIKTSRECHTS 189, 
331–32 (Reinhard Zimmermann ed., 2003); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 64, at 29–44. 
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Seen in this light, tort law establishes the right incentives for private 
individuals to act with the appropriate level of care within their community.  
By this means, the rules of liability do more than establish a metric for 
assessing and judging human activities in hindsight—they also have an 
important forward-looking function.  Roscoe Pound alluded to this 
distinction between an ex post and an ex ante analysis in 1922 when he 
argued that the “ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance 
under the conditions of civilized society.”66  The same idea was later 
expressed by Friedrich Hayek in more familiar terms: the legal order’s rules 
of just conduct not only prohibit or command a certain conduct, but more 
importantly, “tell people which expectations they can count on and which 
not.”67  
Of course, civil liability need not be, and usually is not, the only 
regulatory instrument employed by modern lawmakers.  The state has always 
provided for public and criminal law sanctions in order to deter detrimental 
activity.  Yet even though civil liability is not the only—and probably not 
even the most effective—way to regulate human conduct, it does contribute 
to the overall policy mix of prevention and deterrence.68 
This correlation between substantive policies and party expectations must 
also determine choice of law.  Here as well, party expectations serve as an 
instrument of transmission for the underlying regulatory purposes.  In a well-
balanced system of conflicts law, the behavioral aims of tort liability will 
directly effectuate the actual choice of law even though this is not always 
clearly expressed.  A few examples, discussed below, illustrate this 
correlation. 
Generally, it is the local law that applies to local conduct.  At least in 
cases where all elements of a tort occur within a single jurisdiction’s 
territory, the corresponding “territorialization” of tort rules and expectations 
guarantees that all individuals—potential tortfeasors and victims alike—can 
adapt their activities to the local standard of liability.  This provides for 
sound results under the lens of efficiency analysis, and explains why the lex 
                                                                                                                   
 66 ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 190 (1922). 
 67 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 102 (1973). See also Max 
Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REV. 4, 22 
(1944). 
 68 JAN V. HEIN, DAS GÜNSTIGKEITSPRINZIP IM INTERNATIONALEN DELIKTSRECHT 32 (1999). 
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loci delicti—understood as the law of the place of conduct and injury—is the 
basic rule in many choice-of-law regimes.69  
The situation is different, however, in cases where the applicable law is 
not the lex loci actus (the law at the place of conduct); notably, in scenarios 
of conduct/injury divergence under the rule of the lex loci damni,70 or in 
cases where the lex domicilii communis or an escape clause provide for 
application of a legal regime different from the place of conduct or injury.71  
In these cases, the basis for party expectations may be dubious or even 
absent altogether.  Since the parties are then unable to adapt their conduct to 
the ultimately governing standards, choice of law is an inefficient system of 
meta-regulation.72  Thus, in some scenarios, the unmodified application of 
the lex causae under a formalistic choice-of-law system may distort the 
intended correlation between tort policies and party expectations.  
To take a concrete example, this problem arises where two co-resident 
parties have an accident in a foreign jurisdiction.  If they shared no prior 
relationship and if the tortious encounter was not foreseeable, application of 
the parties’ lex domicilii communis under, for example Article 4(2) of Rome 
II, can thwart each side’s reasonable and justified expectation that an 
accident will be adjudicated primarily under the local law at the place of 
conduct.  Another example is a case where conduct and injury occur in 
different jurisdictions.  Allowing the tortfeasor to rely on the law at the place 
of conduct may lead to a comparable distortion, particularly with respect to 
the victim’s expectations.  And conversely, requiring the tortfeasor to adapt 
his activities to the standard of liability at the place of injury—though 
potentially providing for economically sound results73—would still require 
the foreign consequences of such activity to be foreseeable.  In all of these 
examples, the conduct-regulating incentives under the substantive regime are 
at least in part suspended by a content-neutral choice of law. 
In order to avoid such distortion in conflicts cases, the liability/conduct 
correlation in substantive law requires an accordant effectuation in choice of 
law.  Only by a consistent transmission of tort policies through the 
                                                                                                                   
 69 See Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1179, 1217 (2000); Gerhard Wagner, Ehrenschutz und Pressefreiheit 
im europäischen Zivilverfahrens- und Internationalen Privatrecht, 62 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (RABELSZ) 243, 255 (1998); GISELA 
RÜHL, STATUT UND EFFIZIENZ 637–58 (2011). 
 70 See, e.g., Rome II, supra note 8, art. 4(1). 
 71 See id. art. 4(2)–(3). 
 72 Schäfer & Lantermann, supra note 64, at 116; RÜHL, supra note 69, at 649–50. 
 73 Schäfer & Lantermann, supra note 64, at 117. 
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instrument of party expectations can the regulatory function of substantive 
law be upheld.  Ultimately, parties’ expectations are what determine the 
choice of the applicable tort regime.  This, as we will see in an instant, is the 
domain of local-data consideration.  First, however, we must understand the 
major defect of the theory of local data and why it cannot be cured. 
B.  Caveat: The Vertical Inseparability of Policies 
The correlation between substantive tort policies and choice of law also 
stands at the center of U.S. tort conflicts law.  But even though this approach, 
unlike traditional European doctrine, has made a first step in the right 
direction by explicitly projecting the regulatory function of tort law to the 
conflicts level, it still suffers from an inherent defect.  
The distinction between “conduct-regulating” and “loss-allocating” norms 
has been described as “one of the few breakthroughs in modern American 
conflicts law.”74  It was first developed by New York courts,75 and was later 
incorporated into statutory conflicts law—notably, in the Louisiana choice-
of-law code.76  The distinction seems to offer a straightforward rule: conduct-
regulating norms aim primarily at deterrence, while loss-distributing norms 
concern the reparation of losses.77  The first category comprises not only of, 
for example, rules of the road (e.g., speed limits and traffic-light rules), but 
also of the attendant rules on civil sanctions and presumptions and inferences 
attached to such violations.78  As the leading U.S. conflicts treatise explains, 
“conduct-regulating rules are territorially oriented, whereas loss-distribution 
rules are usually not territorially oriented.”79 
Not surprisingly, U.S. commentators have also suggested that local-data 
theory and Article 17 of Rome II be interpreted to reflect the same 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana’s New Law of Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An 
Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677, 705 (1992). 
 75 See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189 (1985).  
 76 LA. CIV. CODE ANN., arts. 3542–44 (2015). 
 77 In the same vein, albeit without further elaboration, single voices in German commentary 
have suggested that the dividing line more clearly demarcates the categories of 
Haftungstatbestand and Haftungsausfüllung.  See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 35, at 5; Christian 
von Bar, Grundfragen des Internationalen Deliktsrechts, 21 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 961, 968 
(1985); ERWIN WAGNER, STATUTENWECHSEL UND DÉPEÇAGE IM INTERNATIONALEN 
DELIKTSRECHT UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DER DATUMTHEORIE 147, 188–89 
(1988). 
 78 See Symeonides, supra note 29, at 189; PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17.36 
(5th ed. 2010). 
 79 HAY ET AL., supra note 78, § 17.36. 
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categorization.80  Yet it is questionable whether the concept provides for a 
workable benchmark at all.  This is due to the fact that a clear-cut distinction 
between substantive policies is problematic, if not infeasible.  The viability 
of the distinction has already been convincingly challenged in U.S. legal 
debate.  In essence, virtually all rules on tort liability are, if not primarily, at 
least also, loss allocating.  And since almost all rules on loss allocation create 
an incentive to avoid injury, practically all tort rules also have a conduct-
regulating effect.81  
The discussion above shows that this critique has an economic basis.82  It 
is not only liability’s existence, but also its ultimate extent (i.e., the amount 
of damages), that determines the optimal level of care and the optimal 
frequency of activity.  Of course, conduct-regulating rules directly determine 
what is permitted.  However, the amount of losses that are (re)allocated also 
contributes to the regulatory aim.  In economic terms, the expectation of 
liability covers all costs associated with a certain activity.83 
From this standpoint, it may in fact be impossible to develop a 
meaningful and workable distinction separating conduct-regulating norms 
from loss-allocating ones.  In the end, all tort norms are relevant for the 
combined compensatory and preventive function of tort liability rules.  
Indeed, the category of local norms of safety and conduct seems to be a 
contradiction in terms. 
C.  A Horizontally-Layered Model of Liability Rules 
This need not be the end of the exploration.  In fact, it must not be.  
Without giving regard to the interplay of substantive policies and party 
expectations, as the above examples have illustrated, choice of law can end 
up spurning the goal of injury prevention.  Depending on the scenario, the 
choice of a regime other than the law at the place of conduct or injury may 
be drastically distortive of the behavioral justification of a tort-law order.  In 
these cases, the consideration of local data provides the necessary instrument 
to escape the conundrum of an overly formalistic choice-of-law rule. 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Symeonides, supra note 29, at 212. 
 81 Wendy C. Perdue, A Reexamination of the Distinction between “Loss-Allocating” and 
“Conduct-Regulating Rules,” 60 LA. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2000).  For an early characterization 
of such mixed policies, see CAVERS, supra note 24, at 144. 
 82 See supra Part III.A. 
 83 See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 64, at 199–200; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability 
Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).  For analysis in the international tort law 
context, see HEIN, supra note 68, at 33–34. 
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However, it must be acknowledged that giving regard to local rules of 
safety and conduct necessarily remains limited to guaranteeing an 
approximation of the optimal result at best.  After all, there is no clear-cut 
and fully convincing norm categorization under the theories put forth to date.  
The Europeans’ reading of tea leaves with respect to party expectations in 
local-data analysis is inconsistent and often unworkable.84  The U.S. 
distinction between conduct-regulating and loss-allocating rules is hardly 
better.  It will ultimately get caught in a vicious circle of virtually ubiquitous 
dual-policy norms.  This, as we have seen, reflects the more fundamental 
problem of the tort system’s inability to be segmented according to its 
economic functions.85  
Yet the mere existence of Article 17 of Rome II and of comparable 
doctrines in other jurisdictions indicates that a distinction is important, even 
if the outcome may not be ideal.  While a perfect rule of categorization does 
not exist, theoretical consistency and practical workability are not beyond 
reach.  Essential for an alternative approach is the precise replication of the 
policy/expectations correlation and a practically workable determination of 
the different categories.  
1.  Stratification 
As the debate in U.S. doctrine illustrates, the distinction between conduct 
regulation and loss allocation is not only theoretically dubious, but also 
particularly hard to handle in practice.  However, as a closer look at the 
fundamentals of tort liability unveils, there still is another way to conceive of 
the dichotomy.  This categorization may still have to accept that any 
distinction must disregard the fact that an economically consistent result can 
be achieved only through an all-or-nothing approach—that is, that a 
dépeçage will ultimately lead to an invalidation of tort policies.  
Nevertheless, it may offer the best escape from the lex causae.  
The fundamental question in tort law is: is the defendant liable to the 
plaintiff?  This question usually presents an array of closely related yet still 
largely independent legal tests on different issues.  Lawyers are familiar with 
these schemata; many of these are common sense for laypeople as well.  For 
a negligence claim, for instance, the trier of fact may have to apply rules 
regarding: (1) conduct (duty/breach), (2) causation, and (3) damages.  Some 
                                                                                                                   
 84 See supra Part II.C. 
 85 See supra Part III.B. 
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of these rules have a direct implication for private individual conduct since 
they immediately correlate with the question of whether a certain activity is 
admissible at all.  They signal whether the activity at issue is part of the 
“dos” or “don’ts” of the legal order.  However, this is only a part of the 
domain.  There are also rules that must be tested downstream in the 
analysis—for example, the amount of damages in the case of breach.  Such 
rules are not only content-neutral in the sense that they attach consequences 
to norm violations without regard to the specific policy underlying the 
conduct rule that has been violated, but they are also devoid of an immediate 
signaling function.  They simply dock to the upstream finding of, for 
example, negligent conduct (breach).86  
Looking at tort liability under this more simplified perspective provides 
the basis for a differently aligned norm stratification.  Certain norms, in both 
private and public law, provide for an immediate setting and framework in 
which individual socioeconomic transactions can evolve.  These norms 
determine what is admissible and inadmissible—in this regard, they have the 
function of signaling the boundaries of legitimate activity.  These rules of 
just conduct, so to speak, are a condition for liability; their violation forms 
the basis of any tort claim.87  At the same time, and this is crucial, these first-
category rules in their entirety constitute the Magna Carta of freedom of 
activities.  Any activity undertaken in compliance with these primary rules 
will be free from liability.  This bright-line signaling function qualifies these 
rules as indicators for the relevant party expectations.  
This explains the difference between the first and second categories of 
norms.  The second category contains all norms regarding the consequences 
for when a first-category norm has been violated.  In other words, the second 
category provides sanctions for violations of the first category of norms.  Of 
course, as we have seen above, if second-category norms are substituted with 
a different law’s provisions through choice of law, the local order may also 
                                                                                                                   
 86 As explained above, this does not mean that the issue of damages is irrelevant for the 
preventive policies of tort law.  See supra Part III.A.  The issue here rather concerns the 
immediate function of signaling a “do or don’t” of the legal order. 
 87 The distinction between norms of conduct and sanction norms is not new.  It is, inter 
alia, the basis of German criminal law doctrine.  See K. BINDING, DIE NORMEN UND IHRE 
ÜBERTRETUNG – VOL I: NORMEN UND STRAFGESETZE 45 (2d ed. 1890) (“[D]ie verbindliche 
Richtschnur des Handelns, . . . ist das rechtliche Verbot oder Gebot als solches ohne irgend 
welche Hinweisung des Handelnden auf die Rechtsfolgen, welche an die Handlung als an 
deren Bedingung geknüpft sind.”) [“The authoritative guideline of conduct . . . is the legal 
prohibition or order to act as such, without any reference to the legal consequences or 
sanctions that may be attached to the conduct as a condition.”]. 
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be affected.88  Yet, with respect to parties’ expectations, such a substitution is 
less intrusive here than it is for the first-category rules.  The substitution of a 
first-category norm directly alters the system of “dos and don’ts” under the 
local regime.  The consequent distortion of policies and expectations is 
direct, particularly with regard to activities that are admissible in one 
jurisdiction but not the other.  By contrast, the substitution of a second-
category norm has only indirect effects.  With this modification in mind, 
Cavers’s explanation is a lucid one: the “standard of conduct” or the “basis 
of liability” is intimately connected to the regulating state and is thus 
irreplaceable in choice of law.  In contrast, a more or less liberal rule on 
recovery only rarely directly affects the regulating state’s policies.89  
2.  Categorization 
On this basis, a practical categorization suggests itself quite readily.  It is 
not contested—and our horizontal stratification also suggests—that norms 
providing for sanctions are subject to the lex causae.  This category is not an 
issue of local data.  Norms within this group concern, for instance, rules on 
the qualitative and quantitative features of remedies (e.g., injunctive relief or 
damages).  In addition, they determine who holds a claim, and may provide 
for deduction from (e.g., due to insurance payments) or caps on the amount 
of damages.  They also provide for the rules on statutory limitation.90 
The first category raises more delicate problems of demarcation.  The 
category of local rules of safety and conduct covers a large variety of norms.  
Generally speaking, it comprises all rules providing the basis for liability.  
These norms determine whether the alleged tortfeasor has breached a duty 
and whether he acted with the necessary state of mind.  This is the 
foundation of negligence and intentional torts.  For particularly hazardous 
activities, the legal system may also decide in favor of liability on the basis 
of mere risk-creation (e.g., strict liability). Yet under current doctrine, rules 
                                                                                                                   
 88 See supra Part III.A. 
 89 CAVERS, supra note 24, at 143–44. 
 90 This is the dominant doctrine in European and Swiss Commentary.  See Rome II, supra 
note 8, art. 15; Federal Statute on Private International Law (IPRG), art. 142(1), RS 291, Dec. 
18, 1987 (Switz.).  See also Karsten Thorn, art. 15 Rom II-VO, in BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 
para. 1 (Peter Bassenge et al. eds., 73d ed. 2014); Karsten Thorn, art. 17 Rom II-VO, in 
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH para. 1 (Peter Bassenge et al. eds., 73d ed. 2014); Umbricht & 
Zeller, supra note 13, para. 9; Heini, supra note 13, para. 6. 
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regarding the standard of care are not consistently treated as “rules of safety 
and conduct.”91  A closer look at the debate helps rectify a misconception:  
As held by German practice, for instance, local law not only governs the 
issue of breach with respect to rules of conduct but also determines whether 
the alleged tortfeasor failed to exercise reasonable care.  For example, this 
applies when two people who share the same habitual residence, but who do 
not have a preexisting relationship, are involved in an accident in another 
country.92  The situation is different, however, in “isolated” two-party 
scenarios.  For example, if two people who share the same habitual residence 
are traveling together in a car in another country, and one of them causes an 
accident and injures the other, he will be held accountable under the local 
rules of conduct.  However, with respect to the standard of care (negligence), 
the parties are considered to have “brought” their lex communis with them.93  
This rule is another facet of the paradoxical deterritorialization illustrated 
earlier.94  In other words, European doctrine contends that there is a 
difference between the objective rules of conduct and the correlated level of 
care that an actor must comply with, in the sense of, “[p]lease follow local 
rules—yet feel free to be as neglectful as you are at home.”95 
In light of our new horizontal dichotomy, this differentiation invites 
doubts.  In fact, any distinction between rules of plain command or 
prohibition (i.e., “do or don’t”) and the attendant level of care for which the 
                                                                                                                   
 91 See, e.g., Junker, supra note 14, para. 17 (explaining the issues of “fault” and “standard 
of care” as being part of the lex causae).  
 92 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Jan. 23, 1996, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT-RECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT ZIVILRECHT (NJW-RR) 732 (733), 1996 (Ger.); 
Thomas Pfeiffer, Die Entwicklung des Internationalen Vertrags-, Schuld- und Sachenrechts in 
den Jahren 1995/96, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT (NJW) 1207, 1215 (1997); Manfred 
Wandt, Zum Anwendungsbereich der RAnwV bei im Ausland erlittenen Verkehrsunfällen - Zur 
Berücksichtigung des Mitverschuldens des deutschen, bei einem Verkehrsunfall in Norwegen 
Geschädigten, VERSICHERUNGSRECHT (VERSR) 1043 (1998).  
 93 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 10, 2009, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT (NJW) 1482 (1485), 2009 (Ger.); Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG] [Higher 
Regional Court of Hamm] Nov. 26, 1996, VERSICHERUNGSRECHT (VERSR) 1040 (1042), 1998 
(Ger.).  But see Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 21, 1978, 
VERSICHERUNGSRECHT (VERSR) 541, 1978 (Ger.); KAHN-FREUND, supra note 35, at 96; 
SIEGHÖRTNER, supra note 41, at 426–27. 
 94 See supra Part II.C. 
 95 In the same vein, it seems to be acknowledged that if the lex causae prescribes a standard 
of strict liability, the tortfeasor’s local conduct and care are irrelevant.  Article 17 of Rome II 
is then deemed to remain without effect.  See, e.g., Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, The 
Rome II Regulation: On the way towards a European Private International Law Code, 3 EUR. 
LEGAL FORUM I-77, at 90 (2007).  For pre-Rome doctrine, see Stoll, supra note 29, at 174. 
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individual is held responsible is questionable, if not impossible.  Rules of 
conduct and level of care are inseparable with respect to the ultimate effect 
on the regulated activity.  For example, conduct regulation may provide for 
strict liability, in which case, any conduct that causes damage will generally 
create liability.  Policy-makers can, however, also establish a less prohibitive 
regime of negligence liability.  But here they can still choose between 
different levels of care, with the most rigid level effectively resembling strict 
liability and the most liberal one providing for liability only in cases of gross 
or wanton negligence.96  Depending on the level of protection that policy-
makers intend to establish, they may calibrate and fine-tune a sliding scale of 
regulatory impulses consisting of both objective conduct rules and rules 
regarding the individual level of care.  
Accordingly, for choice of law, a differentiation must be avoided in toto.  
Back to the example of two automobilists who share the same habitual 
residence and who are visiting a country where the local law provides for 
strict liability, while their lex communis provides for negligence liability 
only; if these travelers were allowed to rely on the more liberal home 
standard, they might ultimately engage in riskier behavior than permitted 
locally.  In this case, the local policymakers’ preferred legal order would be 
“substituted” and distorted.  
Similarly, it follows that the first category must cover rules regarding 
whether a victim’s conduct eliminates liability (through, for example, the 
doctrine of contributory negligence).97 The first category must also address 
delictual capacity,98 vicarious liability,99 and whether the tortfeasor can rely 
on a justifying cause for his wrong.100 
                                                                                                                   
 96 See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 65, § 34 (discussing the different possible 
“degrees of negligence”).  See also Dirk Looschelders, Persönlichkeitsschutz in Fällen mit 
Auslandsberührung, 95 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (ZVGLRWISS) 
48, 70 (1996). 
 97 For the inseparability of the issues of negligence and contributory negligence, see 
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 848 (7th Cir. 1999).  For discussion of Article 
17 of the Rome II Regulation and its (reverse) application to contributory negligence, see 
DICKINSON, supra note 58, para. 15.34.  
 98 von Bar, supra note 77, at 967.  But see Oberlandesgericht Celle [OLG] [Higher 
Regional Court of Celle], July 12, 1965, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT (NJW) 302, 1966 
(Ger.); Heini, supra note 13, at 1583; TRUTMANN, supra note 32, at 106 (categorizing the 
issue of delictual capacity as part of the lex causae).  
 99 See von Bar, supra note 77, at 967.  For extensive analyses of the interests involved, see 
Willis L.M. Reese & Alma Suzin Flesch, Agency and Vicarious Liability in Conflict of Laws, 
60 COLUM. L. REV. 764, 773, 776 (1960).  But see Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme 
Court] May 15, 1984, 110(II) ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZER BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] 188, 
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D.  From Norm Categories to Party Expectations 
The foregoing categorization of norms is the first step in the process.  The 
second step consists of reconciling actually or potentially conflicting party 
expectations.  The decision maker will have to decide which side’s 
expectations should trump in the analysis.  A consistent theory of 
correlations between norm categories and party expectations allows for a 
workable solution to the scenarios illustrated above. 
1.  Transformation 
Our model of the liability/expectations correlation shows that it is usually 
local law that applies to local conduct.101  This territorialization of tort 
policies implies that—at least in principle—a tortfeasor cannot rely on a 
standard different from the local law at the place of conduct.  Nor may a 
victim expect the application of a standard other than local law.  
In Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., Chief Judge Posner ridiculed an 
alleged divergence of expectations and local safety standards by using the 
zoological metaphor of a tort victim “carrying his domiciliary law with him, 
like a turtle’s house, to every foreign country he visit[s].”102  Posner 
concluded that “[l] aw is largely territorial, and people have at least a vague 
intuition of this.”103  
Yet such a divergence of local standards and expectations is not 
impossible.  On the contrary, it may even be a necessary consequence of the 
correlation between tort policies and party expectations.  In particular, if the 
tortfeasor’s conduct has international implications, expectations concerning 
the potentially applicable law or laws must be extended accordingly.  Hence, 
depending on the activity and its possible consequences, it may also be 
                                                                                                                   
193 (Switz.); Reichsgericht [RG] [Federal Court of Justice of the German Reich] July 9, 1892, 
29 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 90 (93) (Ger.); Günther 
Beitzke, Kollisionsrechtliches zur Deliktshaftung juristischer Personen, in INTERNATIONALES 
RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR F. A. MANN ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 107, 
113–14 (Werner Beck et al. eds., 1977); TRUTMANN, supra note 32, at 109.  
 100 DELACHAUX, supra note 32, at 180–81; STIG STRÖMHOLM, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 140–41 (1961); Dörner, supra note 60, at 11.  Here, as well, dominant European 
doctrine holds a contrary opinion.  See, e.g., Heini, supra note 13, at 1584; TRUTMANN, supra 
note 32, at 102–03; Junker, supra note 14, paras. 17, 24.  
 101 See supra Part III.A. 
 102 Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 103 Id. 
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reasonably expected that a second standard (or multiple standards) could 
apply.104 
Again, in terms of our foregoing economic explanation:105 the preventive 
and deterrent effect of tort liability would be diminished if the potential 
tortfeasor was allowed to rely on the lex loci actus even though her conduct 
had foreseeable effects in other jurisdictions.106  And even though, with 
respect to the behavioral economics of tort regulation, the parties’ 
expectations should take into account both the rules on safety and conduct 
and the rules on sanctions,107 this kind of territorialization concerns primarily 
the first category of norms.  
Here we must recur to the foregoing norm categorization: rules on safety 
and conduct directly determine individual conduct.  These norms are the 
prime signals for a demarcation of what is admissible in a community’s 
socioeconomic order.  In other words, they delineate the domain of activities 
that are beyond the threat of liability.  
Accordingly, private parties’ “vague intuition” (to use the words of Judge 
Posner) of the correlation between law and territory also differs.  Sanction 
norms in our second category are not equipped with a comparable signaling 
function.  Their application and effects are less evident to the parties than 
those of the first category.  Accordingly, the parties are not supposed to be 
informed about or to accommodate rules in the second category of the lex 
loci actus. 
Here, a second look at the example of two people (with the same habitual 
residence) who are traveling abroad is illustrative.  Of course, both tortfeasor 
and victim will expect an application of the local rules of safety and conduct 
at the place of the accident—they actually have to.  In terms of sanctions, 
however, a more flexible handling is possible.  Consider a cap on damages: if 
the parties’ lex communis, unlike the local tort law, provides for unlimited 
liability (or vice versa), this is what the parties will reasonably expect.  As 
we have seen, a norm substitution of this kind will not directly affect the 
local order.  And it is not irrational for the parties to expect the lex communis 
to be applied with regard to the consequences of improper conduct.  On the 
contrary: while an automobilist must rationally inquire about and 
accommodate the local rules of the road, he may not consider escaping, on 
the basis of foreign tort norms, a part of his liability vis-à-vis another 
                                                                                                                   
 104 See Rheinstein, supra note 67, at 26. 
 105 See supra Part III.A. 
 106 Schäfer & Lantermann, supra note 64, at 117; RÜHL, supra note 69, at 655. 
 107 See supra Part III.A. 
2016] “LOCAL DATA” IN EUROPEAN CHOICE OF LAW  333 
 
 
passenger who shares the same habitual residence.  In other words, he is 
supposed to know what to do or not to do in order to avoid liability, but he 
will usually not calculate the ultimate scope of such liability. 
As the following discussion demonstrates, this transformation of the norm 
stratification into reasonable party expectations as an element of conflicts 
justice helps resolve the contentious cases illustrated above.  
2.  Solutions for the Contested Scenarios 
The first contested scenario concerns the allegedly “flexible” territoriality 
of local rules of safety and conduct—particularly traffic laws on alcohol 
levels and seatbelt use.108  
For this scenario, a look at policies and related expectations yields a clear 
result.  First, the territoriality of traffic laws and the underlying policies is 
evident.  After all, the most basic purpose of restricting drunken driving is to 
secure public safety on local streets.  The same applies to seatbelt 
regulations.109  Even though no immediate third-party injury will ensue from 
a person’s failure to buckle up, it is hardly questionable that seatbelt rules, in 
addition to ensuring self-protection for the obligated individual, foster a 
public policy.  Reducing accident injuries is the most fundamental purpose of 
tort law110—this also is the gist of seatbelt regulations.  
In terms of party expectations, the result does not differ.  Regulation of 
local traffic is immediately reflected in actors’ expectations.  Drivers will 
take care not to exceed the intoxication threshold for fear of both criminal 
sanctions and civil liability under the local regime.  Moreover, any party will 
be aware that violating local seatbelt regulations may result in both 
administrative sanctions and consequences with respect to driver and 
passenger tort claims and obligations.  Unlike the conventional 
understanding in European doctrine, all parties must be expected to know 
that they are “subject to the traffic laws of another state when driving in that 
state.”111  Like alcohol limits, seatbelt rules are strictly territorial under a 
perspective of party expectations.112 
                                                                                                                   
 108 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 109 But see STOLL, supra note 14, at 265 (seat belt regulations follow no policy to protect 
third parties). 
 110 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 24–33 (1970). 
 111 Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 2003 WL 22317425, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2003). 
 112 See Bonelli v. Giguere, 2004 WL 424089, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2004). 
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The only exception where sufficient socioeconomic contact with a 
jurisdiction—and, accordingly, parties’ expectations that they will be 
subjected to local standards—can be denied is in cases where the tort has 
“occurred in an ‘insulated environment.’ ”113  For this exceptional category, 
however, a cautious analysis is required in order to avoid a rash verdict.  A 
frequently cited example of such “isolation” is liability among members of a 
travel group.114  If, for example, one of the travelers is a physician who 
negligently treats one of his fellow travelers, party expectations are said to 
allow for reference to their lex communis.  At first glance, there is no 
relevant “local contact.”  However, the physician’s conduct, as in traffic 
accidents, may often also affect the local public—and this may be 
foreseeable for all parties involved.  If, for instance, the physician overlooks 
a contagious disease (risking its spread beyond the group), the application of 
local law corresponds to both local lawmakers’ interests and to the parties’ 
justified expectations.115 
The second problematic scenario concerns cases where conduct and 
injury occur in different jurisdictions.116  Variation 1, where the lex loci actus 
provides for a more liberal regime of the local order than the lex loci damni, 
may serve as a starting point: unless the injury is reasonably foreseeable, 
there is no interest in regulating the conduct at issue on the side of the state 
where the injury occurs.  Tort liability rules can exert their intended effect of 
prevention and deterrence with respect to a certain activity only if the results 
of this activity can be foreseen.  Absent such foreseeability, individual 
conduct cannot be influenced by a threat of liability.  Therefore, under the 
lens of preventive policies and their transnational enforcement, conduct with 
unforeseeable consequences must remain an extraterritorial affair.  
Consequently, in these cases neither substantive policies nor party 
expectations require giving regard to a standard of conduct beyond the place 
of the action. 
However, this is not true if the injury is foreseeable.  Here, the legal order 
at the place of injury has a preventive interest.  The tortfeasor cannot escape 
                                                                                                                   
 113 See KAHN-FREUND, supra note 35, at 81. 
 114 See, e.g., Heinz Binder, Zur Auflockerung des Deliktsstatuts, 20 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (RABELSZ) 401, 480 (1955). 
 115 True, the physician may argue that in the inter-domiciliary relationship no expectation of 
a better treatment could have been expected even though this would have been the local 
standard among the profession.  Yet, the patient-victim has a justified interest in treatment in 
accordance with the higher local standard, because the alternative of contracting with a more 
competent or diligent local doctor would have been possible. 
 116 For example, see supra Part II.C.1. 
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his expected liability.  Yet a clarification is in order with regard to cases 
where a certain activity (e.g., libel in the course of a political campaign) is 
privileged in the state where the conduct occurs, but not under the law of the 
state where the victim is affected (e.g., in the case of libel, where the victim’s 
reputation is damaged).117  It is questionable whether the state where the 
conduct occurs may demand that its liberal policy be considered in other 
states.  This would extraterritorially (and thus in principle illegitimately) 
extend its regulatory interests.  In any event, the territoriality of expectations 
suggests the opposite result: nobody can carry his own law abroad.118  
Whether a court in the state of the tortfeasor’s conduct would find the stricter 
regime incompliant with the local ordre public is, of course, a different 
question.119 
The transformation is also helpful for the reverse scenario outlined in 
variation 2.  If the standard of conduct is stricter at the place of acting, one 
may argue in favor of applying the local rules of safety and conduct taken 
from the lex loci actus.120  An analysis in terms of U.S. doctrine—that is, 
under the interest-analysis perspective of true and false conflicts—may 
suffice to explain the result.  After all, both jurisdictions have an interest in 
applying their law; enforcing the stricter policy at the place of conduct will 
attend to both of their interests.121  
This result can also be explained in light of transformed party 
expectations.  Of course, it may be argued that the tortfeasor’s activity, even 
though illegal at the place of conduct, did not violate the standard of conduct 
at the place of injury.  Yet in this case, parties’ expectations are clear.  First, 
the tortfeasor has no justified expectations.  Once again, Cavers’s verdict 
comes to mind: the tortfeasor’s conduct is then “just as bad when the victim 
is an outsider as an insider.”122  Furthermore, it is not clear why, as is often 
contended, application of the lex loci actus should not comply with the 
victim’s reasonable expectations and ultimately even exceed his justified 
                                                                                                                   
 117 CAVERS, supra note 24, at 142–43. 
 118 Id. See also Looschelders, supra note 96, at 70–71. 
 119 But see CAVERS, supra note 24, at 143 (“Probably a court in [the state where the conduct 
occurred] would never reach this principle [i.e., application of the stricter law], finding its own 
rules applicable ‘by construction and interpretation.’ ”). 
 120 See, e.g., Symeonides, supra note 29, at 192, 214.  But see Bach, supra note 55, paras. 
10–11. 
 121 See, e.g., Symeonides, supra note 29, at 214 (noting that there is no true conflict of 
interests, but a “classic ‘false conflict’ ” in the terminology of interest analysis). 
 122 CAVERS, supra note 24, at 160. 
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prospects.123  Of course, it is often only with an eye on the victim’s 
immediate environment and the local standard of safety and conduct that he 
can reasonably expect to be protected.  Yet it has never been explained why 
the victim should always strictly limit his expectations to the jurisdiction of 
presence or residence and not also be allowed to reasonably expect that 
foreign-based activities should comply with the respective foreign 
jurisdiction’s rules of safety and conduct. Particularly in border areas,124 a 
tort victim’s reasonable expectations may concern not only protection under 
the regulatory order of a single state but also protection by foreign states. 
IV.  SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
At the center of the chasm between European and U.S. conflict law lies 
an area of the discipline that remains the terra incognita Ehrenzweig began 
to explore more than fifty years ago.  In particular, the European approach to 
local data is still subject to numerous doubts.  The European hesitance to 
implement substantive concerns hampers the development of a consistent 
theoretical and practical approach.  The fear seems to be that the vice of 
American-style interest analysis could enter through the backdoor of issue-
by-issue consideration and dépeçage.  However, a consistent solution 
requires exactly that.  
To rectify the current conundrum, the instrument of local-data 
consideration must be reconceptualized.  Looking at local data from a 
perspective of the interplay between substantive and conflicts justice 
highlights the need for a stringent reterritorialization.  What is needed is a 
horizontal stratification of tort liability norms into two categories.  The first 
category covers rules of just conduct that constitute a basic framework for 
the legal order and its preventive-deterrent function.  These norms are strictly 
territorial.  The second category comprises all sanction-related norms and 
allows for a more individualized deterritorialization.  For traditional 
European choice of law, this new perspective requires taking off a well-worn 
blindfold: the theory of local data has never been an instrument of the mere 
“taking account of” rules of safety and conduct.  It is the outright application 
of such rules. 
                                                                                                                   
 123 But see Bach, supra note 55, para. 11 (arguing that these expectations would not be 
“worthy of protection”). 
 124  For example, the case of blasting activities near state borders.  See supra note 50 and 
accompanying text. 
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All things considered, this new perspective reflects a global development.  
What was once deemed “private” is no longer an issue of exclusively 
individual transactions.  Tort law in particular has become a field of 
socioeconomic regulation.  International cases are not excluded from this 
momentum.  To the contrary, in virtually all choice-of-law scenarios, 
substantive policies and state interests are at stake.  The theory of local data 
is thus pars pro toto for the transformation toward a more policy-oriented 
approach. 
  
